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NOTES 
Admissibility of Parol Evidence in Judicial 
Determinations of Arhitrahility 
Whether parol evidence of bargaining history is admissible in a 
court's determination of arbitrability is a problem arising out of 
the United States Supreme Court's 1960 decisions in the Steel-
workers Trilogy.1 The Court there emphasized the national labor 
policy favoring arbitration as the best means of resolving labor dis-
putes.2 Citing its earlier Lincoln Mills decision3 interpreting section 
30l(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act,4 the Court stated 
that, in enacting section 301, Congress assigned the question of the 
jurisdiction of an arbitrator to the courts5 in the absence of an 
agreement by the parties specifically assigning the question to an 
arbitrator. While rejecting a judicial criterion of ordering arbitra-
tion of only those grievances as to which there is a bona fide dis-
pute, 6 the Court specifically avoided "the prescription of inflexible 
rules," stating rather that the lower courts were to be guided by 
"considerations of the milieu in which the clause is negotiated and 
of the national labor policy."7 The parol evidence rule, as often 
I. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); 
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel• 
workers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). 
2. Indeed, its emphasis extends almost to a presumption of arbitration. "An order 
to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with 
positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation 
that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage." 
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., supra note 1, at 582·83. 
3. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
4. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958) provides: "Suits for violation of 
contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in 
an industry affecting commerce • • • , may be brought in any district court of the 
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amounts in 
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." The Court in Lincoln 
Mills stated that § 30l(a) allows federal courts to order specific enforcement of collec• 
tive bargaining agreements providing for arbitration of grievance disputes. Textile 
Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 3, at 451. 
5. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960). This 
threshhold inquiry is usually characterized as deciding the "arbitrability" of the dispute. 
Some confusion has arisen because the term is applied to both the question of whether 
the parties have agreed to give an arbitrator jurisdiction to hear a dispute, and 
whether they have given him authority to make a particular kind of award. In the 
1960 trilogy the Supreme Court was concerned only with the former, as is this Note. 
For a discussion of this distinction and its useful effects, see Schmertz, When and 
Where Issue of Arbitrability Can Be Raised, P-H LAB • .ARB. SERv., Report Bull. No. 3 
July 19, 1962. Procedural arbitrability-determining whether the grievance machinery 
prior to arbitration has been complied with-should also be distinguished. 
6. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 App. Div. 
917, 918, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317, 318, afj'd, 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947). 
7. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570 (1960) (concurring 
opinion of Brennan, J., relating to American, Warrior and Enterprise). Under the 
authority of Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957), the federal 
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applied, would seem to be the type of inflexible rule that the 
Court would wish to avoid. 
The parol evidence rule excludes evidence of prior or con-
temporaneous negotiations and agreements offered to vary or con-
tradict an integrated writing.8 The purpose of the rule is to prevent 
fraud and perjury, but it is well recognized that the rule often 
operates to thwart this purpose since such a device, mechanically 
applied, does not always deal fairly with the human variable.9 Fre-
quently, evidence of probative value is held inadmissible under the 
rule. For this reason courts have developed numerous distinctions 
and exceptions to the rule, purportedly aimed at determining more 
precisely what the parties meant to provide in their written docu-
ment. The most frequently invoked exception to the rule allows a 
court to look to antecedent factors such as negotiations and agree-
ments in order to interpret ambiguities in a writing. Such evidence 
is admissible even though "it has the effect of filling out the terms 
of a promise and of determining the character and extent of the 
performance promised."10 Moreover, since another purpose of the 
rule is to give effect to the finality of a writing,11 when a writing is 
not a complete and exclusive embodiment of what the parties agreed 
to, the partial integration exception to the rule may be applicable, 
and parol evidence may be introduced to show intended additional, 
consistent terms. The latter exception has particular thrust where 
disputed terms are of such a nature that reasonable parties might 
not be expected to include them in the written document.12 
courts are to "fashion" a body of federal substantive labor law. In so doing, they 
may draw upon, and absorb, any state law which furthers this national labor policy. 
Moreover, federal labor law, once created, is to be applied to state as well as federal 
proceedings to enforce labor contracts. Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 
369 U.S. 95, 102-04 (1962). 
8. 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 573, at 357 (1960 ed.). See generally id. §§ 573-85. The 
rule is applied to many kinds of written documents, including contracts, wills, and deeds. 
9. Id. § 575, at 380. Honest, as well as dishonest, men are precluded from testifying 
under this rule. 
IO. Id. § 579, at 423-25. See, e.g., Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Farm Air Serv., Inc., 
255 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1958); United States v. Lennox Metal Mfg. Co., 225 F.2d 302, 
313 (2d Cir. 1955) (suggesting, further, that even ambiguity may not be needed for 
the courts to examine preliminary negotiations); Garden State Plaza Corp. v. S. S. 
Kresge Co., 78 N.J. Super. 485, 189 A.2d 448 (1963). 
11. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 CoLUM, L. REv., 
833, 846 (1964). See also REsrATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 237 (1932): "The integration of 
an agreement makes inoperative to add to or to vary the agreement all contemporaneous 
oral agreements relating to the same subject-matter; and also • . • all prior oral or 
written agreements relating thereto." 
12. 3 CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 8, § 583, at 475. Professor Corbin suggests that the 
Uniform Commercial Code is in substantial agreement with this proposition and that 
it may be applied to transactions other than those merely for the sale of goods. UNI· 
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202 states: "[A] writing .•. may be explained or supple-
mented, •.• (b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the 
writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms 
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The parol evidence rule has its most frequent application in 
the interpretation of ordinary contracts. A collective bargaining 
agreement, however, is not an ordinary contract.13 While the agree-
ment is a contract to the extent that it may be judicially enforced,14 
it is also, in a broader sense, comparable to a compact of self-govern-
ment, often for large numbers of people, negotiated in the setting of 
a going enterprise with the common interests of the parties in the 
balance.15 To preserve and promote these interests, agreement must 
of necessity be reached, even if it does not reflect the parties' posi-
tions on all matters or encompass the entire spectrum of their rela-
tions. Under these circumstances and in the context of the history 
and custom surrounding bargaining agreements, what is not in-
cluded in. the document may be as important as the terms reduced 
to writing.16 This is particularly true when the threshold arbitra-
bility question is at issue since an almost limitless number and 
variety of grievances can be involved. Because of this vast range 
of possible disputes, superimposed upon the reliance on business 
tradition and custom, doubt exists whether, in spite of the applica-
tion of other contract principles to collective bargaining agree-
ments, 17 the parol evidence rule should be invoked to limit a court's 
determination of arbitrability to the face of the agreement.18 
In International Union of Elec. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp.,19 however, the District Court for the Southern District of 
New York applied the parol evidence rule in rejecting evidence of 
prior bargaining history. Plaintiff union had brought suit to compel 
of the agreement." Cf. R.EsrATEMENT, CONTRACIS § 240(1) (1932); 3 CORBIN, op. cit. supra 
note 8, § 584 (discussion of the Restatement position). 
13. See generally United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 
578-82 (1960); GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAw 445-57 (2d rev. ed. 1958); Cox, Reflections 
Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1482 (1959); Cox, The Legal Nature of 
Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1958); Shulman, Reason, Con-
tract, and the Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REv. 999 (1955). 
14. See note 4 supra. 
15. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-81 (1960). 
16. "It is based on a mass of unstated assumptions and practices as to which the 
understanding of the parties may actually differ, and which it is wholly impractical 
to list in the agreement. It is similarly impractical, if not impossible, to anticipate and 
guard against all possible future contingencies .... " Shulman, The Role of Arbitra-
tion in the Collective Bargaining Process, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND ARBITRATION 
19, 21 (1949). 
17. Standards of the proper party to sue, failure of consideration, and notions of 
bargain and exchange have been suggested as relevant in the collective bargaining 
setting. Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MICH, L. REv. 
1, 14-25 (1958). 
18. A court should be able to use such extrinsic evidence as relevant circumstances, 
course of performance, course of dealing, and trade usage in its interpretation of the 
agreement. See Patterson, supra note 11, at 842-52. Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
looked to the practical construction given to the agreement by the parties. Drake 
Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Am. Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254, 260 (1962). 
19. 228 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (hereinafter referred to as the principal case). 
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defendant company to arbitrate grievances which the union claimed 
fell within the clause of the collective bargaining agreement calling 
for arbitration of grievances involving "the interpretation, applica-
tion or claimed violation of a provision" of the agreement.20 The 
company attempted to introduce evidence of the bargaining history 
prior to execution of the collective bargaining agreement to show 
that the exclusionary clause in the agreement "was intended to be 
exclusionary [as to the jurisdiction of an arbitrator to hear griev-
ances of the type claimed by the union] and not merely a limitation 
on the authority of an arbitrator [to make a certain award]."21 The 
court, however, held that parol evidence of bargaining history is 
inadmissible when a court is determining the jurisdiction of an 
arbitrator under a collective bargaining agreement.22 
Application of the parol evidence rule to evidence going to the 
merits of a grievance, or to the arbitrability question when inter-
twined with the merits of the dispute, has been justified, as was 
suggested in the principal case, under the Supreme Court's ad-
monition against judicial involvement in or resolution of the 
substantive merits of the particular grievance.28 However, a thresh-
old determination of the arbitrator's jurisdiction does not involve 
the parties' final rights; it is an inquiry as to who shall decide those 
rights, or, at the least, whether some basis exists for saying that the 
rights should be decided by arbitration. Since arbitrability is both 
by statute24 and judicial opinion25 the very issue that the courts are 
required to determine, the prohibition against examining the merits 
would not seem to justify exclusion of evidence of bargaining his-
tory on a strictly arbitrability issue.26 The court in Westinghouse, 
20. The agreement also contained an exclusionary clause stating that "[N]o 
arbitrator shall •.. be authorized to: (I) Add to, detract from, or in any way alter 
the provisions of this Agreement .•. ; (2) Establish or modify any wage or salary 
rate, job classification or classification of any employee . • • ; (4) Make any award 
involving any matter relating to any pension and/or insurance agreements between the 
parties .•.• " Principal case at 924. 
21. Brief for Defendant, p. 17, principal case. 
22. Principal case at 926. 
23. Ibid. Accord, International Ass'n of Machinists v. International Aircraft Servs., 
Inc., 302 F.2d 808, 813, 815 (4th Cir. 1962); Association of Westinghouse Salaried 
Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 283 F.2d 93, 95 (3d Cir. 1960). 
24. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958). 
25. United Steelworkers v. Warrior &: Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960). 
26. See Independent Petroleum Workers v. American Oil Co., 324 F.2d 903 (7th 
Cir. 1963) (evidence specifically considered, but case decided on other grounds), afj'd 
by an equally divided court, 379 U.S. 130 (1964) (Goldberg, J., took no part in the 
consideration or decision); Independent Soap Workers v. Procter &: Gamble Mfg. 
Co., 314 F.2d 38 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 807 (1963); Pacific Northwest 
Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, 310 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1962); 6A CORBIN, 
CoNTRAcrs § 1444B, at 470 (rule should never exclude bargaining history in arbitrability 
determination); Smith, The Question of "Arbitrability"-The Roles of the Arbitrator, 
the Court, and the Parties, 16 Sw. L.J. 1, 12 (1962). Compare Note, "Arbitrability" of 
Labor Disputes, 47 VA. L. REv. 1182, 1192-93 (1961). Moreover, because this is a 
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nevertheless, concluded that the distinction between a judicial 
resolution of the merits and a judicial determination of arbitrability 
was insufficient to justify a different treatment of the evidence in 
the two situations.27 While the court seemed concerned with the 
possible difficulty of distinguishing between interrelated evidence 
on the two issues "when the alternative is to utilize the services of 
an arbitrator,"28 this also appears to be insufficient reason for denying 
the admission of parol evidence on the arbitrability question where 
the offered evidence is clear and helpful.29 
Moreover, even if the parol evidence rule were held generally 
applicable to collective bargaining agreements, it could be argued 
that evidence of bargaining history should be admissible under one 
of the exceptions to the rule, an argument apparently not made in 
the principal case. The ambiguity exception might, in a proper 
case, be used to admit evidence to resolve language capable of 
more than one meaning.80 Alternatively, although a collective bar-
gaining agreement may be final, it may be at least arguably not 
complete and exclusive, and consequently, the partial integration 
suit for specific performance, there is not the problem of requiring the jury to pass 
on the credibility of the offered evidence. 
27. Principal case at 926. The following cases have invoked the rule in terms 
sufficiently broad to indicate that they would apply it to collective bargaining agree• 
ments generally, without differentiation as to whether the evidence relates to the merits 
or to arbitrability: International Ass'n of Machinists v. International Aircraft Servs., 
Inc., 302 F.2d 808, 813, 815 (4th Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Gulf Atl. Warehouse Co., 291 
F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1961); Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westing• 
house Elec. Corp., 283 F.2d 93, 95 (3d Cir. 1960); District 50, UMW v. Pittston Co., 
210 F. Supp. 781, 785-86 (N.D. W. Va. 1962); Freight Drivers &: Helpers, Local 557 v. 
Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., of Del., 207 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D. Md. 1962); Newspaper Guild 
v. Hammond Publishing Co., 48 L.R.R.M. 2577 (N.D. Ind. 1961). Cf. Lewis v. Owens, 
33 U.S.L. WEEK (6th Cir. Nov. 27, 1964). 
In the leading case to the contrary, Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co. v. Communica• 
tions Workers, 310 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1962), the court carefully drew the distinction 
and admitted evidence of the bargaining history going exclusively to the arbitrability 
issue. The court analyzed Warrior b Gulf and decided that the evidence of bargaining 
history which the majority there ignored went to the merits. In International Union 
of Elec. Workers, 332 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1964), ·the court excluded parol evidence on 
the merits, but expressly refused to comment on the admissibility of such evidence 
relating to arbitrability, suggesting a comparison between the principal case and 
Pacific Northwest Bell. Id. at 490 &: n.6. 
28. United Steelworkers v. Warrior&: Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 585 (1960). 
29. In Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, 310 F.2d 244 
(9th Cir. 1962), the court stated that the "almost inevitable interlocking" of the issues 
of arbitrability and determinaion of the merits does not result in "ousting the courts 
from any inquiry beyond the bare written words themselves." The question is "whether 
judicial construction of the arbitrability clause would require that the underlying 
dispute be first resolved in order to determine whether it is subject to arbitration." 
Id. at 248. (Emphasis added.) 
30. International Union of Elec. ·workers v. General Elec. Co., 332 F.2d 485, 490 
n.5 (2d Cir. 1964) (bargaining history might not be proper to interpret an exclusionary 
clause since "to be effective [such a clause] must be clear and unambiguous'); United 
Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 208 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). 
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exception might be invoked to allow evidence of the scope of the 
agreement to arbitrate by showing additional and consistent terms. 
A number of courts have taken the position that the parol evi-
dence rule should never be applied to exclude evidence going to 
arbitrability.81 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in 
articulating this view, has held that because of the nature of a 
collective bargaining agreement, a court cannot be precluded by 
the parol evidence rule from examining the bargaining history.82 
In order to determine the parties' true intent on the arbitrability of 
a particular grievance, a court should be permitted to go beyond 
the broad language of the agreement to discover how the parties 
have dealt with specific issues.33 Moreover, the need to consider the 
bargaining history has been stressed as particularly compelling when 
a position taken by a party in court is one for which it argued in 
negotiations but lost.84 A party may assert that a particular griev-
ance is covered by the language of the contract, even though that 
interpretation was rejected during· negotiations, without interfer-
ence from the parol evidence rule because he is asserting the actual 
import of the language used rather than the import intended by 
the parties when the contract was written. However, the parol evi-
dence rule will prevent the other party from showing that the 
asserted construction was considered and rejected during negotia-
tions. To allow a party to succeeed on such a claim because of the 
court's refusal to examine bargaining history is not only inconsistent 
with the purposes of the parol evidence rule, but also lays a basis 
31. Communications Workers v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 337 F.2d 455 
(9th Cir. 1964); Independent Petroleum Workers v. American Oil Co., 324 F.2d 903 
(7th Cir. 1963), afj'd by an equally divided court, 379 U.S. 130 (1964) (Goldberg, J., 
took no part in the consideration or decision): Independent Soap ,vorkers v. Procter 
&: Gamble Mfg. Co., 314 F.2d 38 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 807 (1963); 
Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, 310 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 
1962); Maryland Tel. Union v. Chesapeake &: P. Tel. Co., 187 F. Supp. 101 (D. Md. 
1960); Local 725, lnt'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Standard Oil Co., 186 F. Supp. 
895, 903 (D.N.D. 1960). 
32. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, supra note 31. 
See notes 27 &: 29 supra. 
33. See Communications Workers v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 337 F.2d 455 
(9th Cir. 1964). This was the second appeal in the case. On the first appeal, see note 
32 supra, the court sent the case back to the district court to admit evidence of bargain• 
ing history. On the second appeal, the court rejected as inconsistent with the court's 
assigned function of determining arbitrability a union contention for a special rule 
for collective bargaining agreements to the effect that if bargaining history is required 
to ascertain the parties' agreement to arbitrate, the dispute must go to arbitration. 
34. See Maryland Tel. Union v. Chesapeake &: P. Tel. Co., 187 F. Supp. 101, 108 
(D. Md. 1960); Local 725, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Standard Oil Co., 186 
F. Supp. 895, 902·03 (D.N.D. 1960). While taking a very limited view of the interpreta-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement, another court allowed certain testimony of 
bargaining history as relevant evidence of conduct inconsistent with a present claim. 
Connecticut Union of Tel. Workers, v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 148 Conn. 
192, 202, 169 A.2d 646, 651 (1961). For the relevance of such state court decisions to 
§ 301 proceedings, see note 7 supra. 
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for distrust and tension in future negotiations. Holding the parol 
evidence rule inapplicable to section 301 arbitrability proceedings, 
moreover, does not open the door to abuses by the parties nor is it 
an invitation to the courts to speculate, since extrinsic evidence 
must still constitute "forceful evidence" of agreement not to ar-
bitrate certain grievances35 in order to overcome the "presumption" 
of arbitration.36 
The problem of whether to admit evidence of the bargaining 
history appears to be closely related to the concern expressed by 
some courts that the courts are abdicating their explicitly assigned 
role of determining arbitrability.37 The tenor of this argument is that 
the present judicial tendency, influenced by the national policy which 
favors arbitration, is toward ordering arbitration nearly automati-
cally in any section 301 arbitrability suit where the parties have 
generally agreed to arbitrate,38 rather than applying only a presump-
tion of arbitration. It is contended that this "turnstile arbitration" 
distorts the parties' agreement to arbitrate and undermines the par-
ties' confidence in the institution of arbitration as a voluntary means 
of resolving disputes.39 Whether the problem is as grave as some 
suggest, judicial examination of bargaining history does not mean 
that in every case such evidence will prevent a grievance from going 
to arbitration. It does mean, however, that in some cases it may be 
shown that the parties did not agree to arbitrate,40 or, on the other 
hand, that the parties did in fact intend arbitration.41 Finally, in 
35. "In the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance from 
arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim 
from arbitration can prevail, particularly where . • • the exclusion clause is vague 
and the arbitration clause quite broad." United Steelworkers v. Warrior &: Gulf Nav. 
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 584-85 (1960). 
36. See note 2 supra. 
37. See Report of Spedal Warrior r/f Gulf Committee, 1963 PROCEEDINGS, ABA 
SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAw, pt. 2, at 196. The minority report characterized 
the problem as "turnstile arbitration." Id. at 210. The majority report, on the other 
hand, said that the courts were properly performing their assigned function. In-
terestingly, as one indicia of support for their view, the majority said that extrinsic 
evidence had been held admissible in determining arbitrability, citing Pacific Northwest 
Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers of America, 310 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1962). 
PROCEEDINGS, supra at 206. 
38. No doubt this view has arisen at least in part because of the broad language 
of Mr. Justice Douglas in Warrior b Gulf: "Every grievance in a sense involves a 
claim that management has violated some provision of the agreement." 363 U.S. at 
584. See Wellington, Judicial Review of the Promise To Arbitrate, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 
471, 482-83 (1962). Professor Wellington argues for post-arbitration judicial review 
based on a written opinion of the arbitrator. Cf. Procter &: Gamble Independent 
Union v. Procter &: Gamble Mfg. Co., 298 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1962). 
39. See International Union of Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 332 F.2d 485, 
494 (2d Cir. 1964) (dissenting opinion). 
40. See Communications Workers v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 337 F.2d 
455 (9th Cir. 1964); Independent Petroleum Workers v. American Oil Co., 324 F.2d 
903 (7th Cir. 1963); Local 725, Int'! Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Standard Oil Co., 
186 F. Supp. 895 (D.N.D. 1960). 
41. The bargaining history may even show agreement to arbitrate where the 
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many instances the presumption in favor of arbitration may itself 
settle the issue where the bargaining history is not of value in 
determining arbitrability.42 Nevertheless, the nature of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement and the setting out of which it emerges 
suggest that the parol evidence rule is a needless and unreasonable 
restriction on the courts in deciding this question. 
contract does not. Independent Soap Workers v. Procter &: Gamble Mfg. Co., 314 
F.2d 38 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 807 (1963). 
42. See Maryland Tel. Union v. Chesapeake &: P. Tel. Co., 187 F. Supp. 101 
(D. Md. 1960). 
